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A SPARK IN THE BATTLE BETWEEN
SMOKERS AND NONSMOKERS:
JOHANNESEN V NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
PRESERVATION & DEVELOPMENT
At one time, smoking was a symbol of elegance and sophistication
in popular culture.' Over the past few decades, however, smoking has
become less fashionable. 2
 Smokers may face pressure, and even coer-
cion, from relatives and friends who want them to quit. 3
 Because of
recent information about the effects of secondhand smoke, the scope
of that pressure has extended from a concern about the smoker's own
health to include a concern about the effects on nonsmokers who
breathe the same air.'
The first blow to smokers came from a 1964 report of the Surgeon
General that concluded that smoking could increase a person's risk of
lung cancer, chronic bronchitis and emphysema. 5
 Twenty years later
the Surgeon General confirmed what had only been suspected be-
fore—that nonsmokers exposed to cigarette smoke had an increased
risk of acquiring the same diseases. 6
 Finally, in 1992, the Environmental
Larry Kraft, Smoking in Public Places: Living with a Dying Custom, 64 N.D. L. REV, 329, 339
& n.31 (1988) ("[G]igarettes were a prop in constant use by actors in motion pictures."); Nancy
R. Gibbs, All Fired Up Over Smoking, TIME, Apr. 18, 1988, 64, 69 ("Without smoking, it seemed,
great detectives could not detect, writers could not write, lovers could not languish, heroes were
deflated and vamps declawed."),
2 See Gibbs, supra note 1, at 69.
5 See Liz Spayd, Puffing and Persecution, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1994, at B I .
See Tom Kenworthy, Secondhand Smoke Peril Affirmed, WASH. Pow, Jan. 6, 1993, at Al. In
one instance, a conflict between a smoker and a nonsmoker turned violent. See Peter Fimrite,
Murder Charge in Cigarette Killing, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1993, at D4. A mother of four allegedly
shot and killed a nonsmoker who complained when she lit up a cigarette in the nonsmoking
section of a restaurant. Id.
5
 PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 31 (1964) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL (1964)).
6 See PUBLIC HEALTH SF.RV., U.S. DEFT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 7 (1986) [here.
inafter SURGEON GENERAL (1986)]. After reviewing current scientific data, the Surgeon General
listed three major conclusions:
1 involuntary smoking is a cause of disease, including lung cancer, in healthy
nonsmokers.
2. The children of parents who smoke compared with the children of nonsmoking
parents have an increased frequency of respiratory infections, increased respiratory
symptoms, and slightly smaller rates of increase in lung function as the lung
matures.
1089
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Protection Agency (the "EPA") released a report that classified environ-
mental tobacco smoke as a known human lung carcinogen.? Now that
the Surgeon General and the EPA have concluded that the dangers to
nonsmokers' health from tobacco smoke exposure are more serious
than minor annoyances, employers are more likely to enact policies
restricting smoking in the workplace for fear of lawsuits by nonsmokers. 8
Nonsmokers have used various causes of action as the basis for
lawsuits seeking smoking restrictions. 9 Nonsmokers who claim they
have a constitutional right to breathe smoke-free air have not been
successful.'" Attempts to classify smoke allergies as handicaps and bring
disability claims also have proved ineffective in recent years." In gen-
eral, courts have favored nonsmokers who bring claims under the
common-law duty to provide a safe workplace." More recently, in
johannesen v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, a nonsmoker received an award of damages under Work-
ers' Compensation Law for a smoke-related injury." Smokers, however,
have brought lawsuits against employers who enact overly restrictive
anti-smoking policies.' 4 Employers need to think carefully about what
kinds of policies to adopt to avoid lawsuits from either side."
This Note examines trends in lawsuits brought by nonsmokers.
Section I examines the recent medical and scientific evidence regard-
ing the effects of secondhand smoke on nonsmokers." Section II
discusses which causes of action have been most successful for non-
smokers. 17 Section III focuses on lawsuits in the area of Workers' Com-
3. The simple separation of smokers and nonsmokers within the same air space may
reduce, but does not eliminate, the exposure of nonsmokers to environmental
tobacco smoke.
Id.
7 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING:
LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS 1-3 (1992) [hereinafter EPA REPORT].
8 See Edward Felsentlial, EPA Report Sparks Antismoking Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1993, at
Bi ('"fhe Environmental Protection Agency is counting mainly on plaintiffs' lawyers, rather than
regulators, to drive businesses to ban smoking on their premises, and the lawyers are eager to
comply.").
9 See, e.g., Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 86 (WD. Wash. 1982); Casper v.
Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 717 (E.D. La. 1976), affd, 577 E2d 897
(5th Cir. 1978); McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 759 P.2d 351, 352-53 (Wash.
1988).
'° See infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 104-32 and accompanying text.
18 638 N.E.2d 981, 985-86 (N.Y. 1994); see infra notes 193-220 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 225-46 and accompanying text.
15 Andrew M. Kramer & Laurie F. Calder, The Emergence of Employees' Privacy Rights .: Smoking
and the Workplace, 8 LAB. LAW. 313, 333 ( i 992).
16 See infra notes 21-65 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 66-138 and accompanying text.
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pensation.' 8
 Section IV examines the rights of smokers in the work-
place.' 9
 Section V addresses the problems faced by employers with
respect to the rights of smokers and nonsmokers in light of recent
court decisions. 2° Finally, this Note concludes that if employers do not
take steps to prevent nonsmokers from being exposed to tobacco
smoke in the workplace, they will risk increased liability toward non-
smoking employees.
I. EFFECTS OF SECONDHAND SMOKE
A. Medical and Scientific Evidence
Native Americans introduced Christopher Columbus to tobacco
in 1492. 21
 Over the centuries, smoking became a fundamental part of
American culture. 22
 Recently, however, the popularity of smoking has
taken a sharp downturn.'" In 1965, forty-three percent of the United
States population smoked, whereas today that figure is only twenty-five
percent." What was once a social norm is now out of favor with a
majority of Americans." The accumulation of information about the
health effects of smoking on both smokers and nonsmokers provides
one of the main reasons for this shift. 26
In 1964, the Surgeon General released a report on smoking and
health that established causal relationships between cigarette smoking
and diseases such as lung cancer, chronic bronchitis and eniphysema. 27
The report also established a higher incidence of cardiovascular dis-
eases among smokers. 28
 With this report, the Surgeon General began
the war on smoking. 29
 In 1965, Congress enacted legislation requiring
warning labels on cigarette packaging."° In 1971, Congress banned
cigarette advertising from radio and television."'
is See infra notes 139-220 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 221-46 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 247-76 and accompanying text.
21 Gibbs, supra note 1, at 68.
22 See id. at 69. It was not until the start of the twentieth century that smoking became seen
as more of an acceptable custom and gained in popularity. See Kraft, supra note 1, at 335-36.
23 Kraft, supra note 1, at 337.
24
 Spencer Rich, Study Says Adult Smoking Dropped to 25% in 1993, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,
1994, at A6. In addition, 70% of adult smokers said that they wanted to quit. Id.
25 See Kraft, supra note 1, at 336.
26 See Gibbs, supra note 1, at 69-70.
27 SURGEON GENERAL (1964), supra note 5, at 31.
28 Id. at 32.
29 See Gibbs, .supra note 1, at 69.
3° a; see Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408,413 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
31
 Gibbs, supra note 1, at 69; see. Skimp, 368 A.2d at 413.
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The next wave of anti-smoking fervor followed the Surgeon Gen-
eral's 1986 report on the effects of secondhand smoke. 32 The Surgeon
General found that a nonsmoker in the same room as a smoker inhales
a smaller dose of the same harmful agents." The report stated that this
exposure caused lung cancer in adult nonsmokers and respiratory
problems for children of smokers." Furthermore, because of the way
that cigarette smoke disperses in the air, designating "smoking" and
"nonsmoking" sections does not fully protect nonsmokers from expo-
sure to environmental tobacco smoke."
The Surgeon General explained that nonsmokers are exposed to
what is known as environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS"). 36 ETS origi-
nates at the lighted end of a cigarette and spreads through the air."
Many variables affect nonsmokers' exposure, including the number of
smokers in the area, the size of the area and the quality of the venti-
lation." One researcher estimated that the average nonsmoker may
inhale the equivalent of one to two cigarettes each day." Because it
spreads rapidly through the air, ETS exposes anyone in the same
airspace to its effects.° The most common effects of ETS reported
by nonsmokers are irritation of the eyes, nose and throat.'" The Sur-
geon General's report, however, establishes a causal relationship be-
tween secondhand smoke and a wide variety of serious health prob-
lems.42
In 1992, the EPA classified ETS as a "Group A" carcinogen, a
known human lung carcinogen." The report found that approximately
3000 nonsmokers die of lung cancer annually in the United States
"Gibbs, supra note 1, at 71. In this report, the Surgeon General used the terms "passive
smoking" and "involuntary smoking" interchangeably to refer to the exposure of a nonsmoker
to secondhand smoke. SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 6.
33 See SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 6.
34 Id. at 13. The Surgeon General noted that further studies were needed to show whether
there was a causal relationship between involuntary smoking and other forms of cancer and
cardiovascular disease. Id. at 14.
35
 Id. at 13-14.
'6 1d. at 7.
37 Id. at 11. ETS consists of exhaled mainstream smoke ("MS"), which is drawn into the
smoker's mouth, and sidestream smoke ("SS"), which issues from the burning tobacco. Id. at 7.
Although SS has essentially the same composition as MS, studies show that SS may be even more
carcinogenic because it is formed at a lower temperature. Id.
38 SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 11.
32 JUDITH A. DOUVILLE, ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SMOKING HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 4 (1990).
40 SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 11.
41 Id. at 229.
42 See id. at 7-12.
43 EPA REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-3. This classification puts ETS in the same group as
asbestos, arsenic and benzene. Kenworthy, supra note 4, at Al.
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because of exposure to ETS." In addition, ETS increases the severity
of the symptoms of asthmatic children of smokers and may factor into
the onset of new cases of asthma." The EPA has no authority to
regulate smoking, but its administrator, William Reilly, voiced his hope
that the report will encourage lawsuits by nonsmokers." These lawsuits
would then force the federal Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration ("OSHA") to adopt rules regarding smoking in the workplace. 47
B. Reactions to Scientific Findings
Various initiatives to regulate smoking followed the publication of
the 1964 Surgeon General's report." Between the publication of the
Surgeon General's 1986 report and the end of 1987, Congress intro-
duced almost 100 bills related to smoking issues." In general, state and
local governments have used legislation to regulate smoking in public
places.5° At the federal level, administrative agencies have taken steps
to restrict smoking in government offices and on interstate transpor-
tation.." In addition, some businesses have reacted by adopting private
smoking regulations. 52
State governments actually began regulating smoking in the early
twentieth century, mostly as a fire and safety hazard." After the Sur-
44
 EPA REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-4.
45 Id. at 1-5. The report also found a strong association between maternal smoking and
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome ("SIDS"), but the data did not differentiate between prenatal
exposure and postnatal exposure. Id. at 1-6. Furthermore, a recent study published in the journal
of the American Medical Association reported that infants who lived with one or more smoking
adults were 2.2 to 5.3 times as likely to die from SIDS than infants who did not live with smokers.
Thomas H. Maugh II, Crib Death Risk, Secondhand Smoke Linked, L.A. Ttmcs, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al.
46
 Felsenthal, supra note 8, at B1.
42 See Kenworthy, supra note 4, at Al. OSHA is currently considering a ban on smoking in
the workplace and the Food and Drug Administration is considering further regulation of
cigarettes. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 20, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Script File.
48 See SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 263; Gibbs, supra note 1, at 69-71.
49 Susan Ross, Note, Second-Hand Smoke: The Asbestos and Benzene of the Nineties, 25 ARIZ.
Sr. L.J. 713, 714 (1990).
5° See SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 263.
51 M. at 263, 276. OSHA has begun hearings on a proposal that would force employers to
either ban smoking completely or supply a smoking area that is enclosed and ventilated to the
outside. Frank Swoboda, The War on Workplace Smoke Goes Nationwide, WASH. Pos.'', Sept. 18,
1994, at I-11. OSHA received an unprecedented 100,000 public comment letters in response to
this proposal. Id. Smokers may not have to worry yet, however, because OSHA takes an average
of 10 years to enact new regulations. Id.
52
 SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 263.
58
 Nancy Kornblum, Note, Extinguishing Smoking in the Workplace, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 183, 195-96 (1990).
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geon General's 1964 report on smoking, legislative policy shifted to-
ward encouraging smokers to quit. 54 It was not until the 1970s, however,
that smoking restrictions gained momentum. 55 Growing recognition
that cigarette smoke affects the health of nonsmokers as well as smok-
ers fueled these new restrictions. 56 In 1975, Minnesota adopted its
Clean Indoor Air Act, which prohibited smoking in restaurants, private
workplaces and many public places.57 Forty-four states currently have
some type of restriction on smoking in public places. 58 A shift from
state legislation to local ordinances occurred in the 1980s. 59 Many of
these ordinances extended the scope of state laws to include prohibi-
tions on smoking in restaurants and workplaces.w
Most of this legislation, however, only affected public places. 61
Because most adults spend more time at work than at home, exposure
to ETS in the workplace has become a growing concern. 62 By 1991,
eighty-five percent of private businesses had instituted some form of
smoking policy, but the amount of protection these policies afford
nonsmokers varies greatly." As the medical evidence accumulated,
nonsmokers complained more often about sharing workspace with
54 Id. at 196; see SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at '265.
55 See Kornblum, supra note 53, at 196-97.
58 Id.
57 SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at '265. Many similar statutes in other states
followed this one. Id. The statutes clearly stated that their purpose was to protect the health of
nonsmokers. Id.
58 Deborah Potter, CNN News: EPA Says Non -Smokers in Danger from Secondhand Smoke (CNN
Transcripts, Jan. 7, 1993), available in LEX1S, Nexis Library, Script File. The states that have not
passed any legislation are located in the southeast and western part of the United States. See
SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 266; Sue Anne Pressley, Cigarette Clouds Still Drift
Over the West, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at A6. The southern states that have declined to regulate
smoking are located in "tobacco country" (North Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee), which may
explain their reluctance. SURGEON GENERAL (1986), Supra note 6, at 266. The western states
appear to subscribe to the philosophy that they would prefer a little secondhand smoke to any
more government regulation. Pressley, so pro at A6.
Texas recently joined the states that regulate smoking in restaurants. Id. One resident said,
"I never thought I'd see the day ... when I couldn't sit down in a restaurant in Austin and have
me a cup of coffee and a cigarette and read the newspaper. Something's wrong with the world."
Id.
59 SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 275.
61' Id.
61 Raymond L. Paolella, The Legal Rights of Nonsmokers in the Workplace, 10 U. PunEr SOUND
L. REV. 591, 591 (1987). In 1986, only nine states had smoking legislation that included work-
places. SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 285.
82 See SURGEON GENERAL ( 1986), supra note 6, at 284.
88 See Swoboda, supra note 51, at Ell; see aLso SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at
295-96.
September 1995]	 SMOKERS v. NONSMOKERS
	 1095
smokers. 64
 When their employers failed to respond to their complaints,
nonsmokers turned to the legal system for relief. 6'
II, LEGAL ACTIONS BY NONSMOKERS
Nonsmokers exposed to ETS in their work environments have
sued their employers under many different causes of action with vary-
ing degrees of success. 66
 Courts have consistently declined to establish
a constitutional right to breathe smoke-free air. 67 At first, it appeared
that nonsmokers who are sensitive to ETS may be protected as disabled
pursuant to the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 68
 Recent cases,
however, have held that a tobacco sensitivity is not disabling.''`' Never-
theless, nonsmoking plaintiffs have been quite successful in asserting
that employers have a common-law duty to protect them from expo-
sure to ETS based on the recent increase in scientific information
about the health effects of secondhand smoke."
A. Constitutional Claims
In 1976, in Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held
that the United States Constitution does not give nonsmokers a right
to breathe smoke-free air. 7 ' The plaintiffs brought a class action suit on
behalf of all nonsmokers who attended events held in the Louisiana
Superdome, a public facility. 72
 The plaintiffs claimed that by allowing
smoking in the Superdome, the defendants violated the First, Fifth,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." The court
'"4 David B. EMI, "Get Off Your Butts": The Employer's Right to Regulate Employee Smoking, 60
TENN. L. Rev. 905, 906 (1993).
65 See infra notes 66-138 and accompanying text. Recently, Rj. Reynolds announced a plan
to market a new, smokeless cigarette called Eclipse. Philip j. Hilts, Little Smoke, Little Tar, But Full
Dose of Nicotine, N.Y. Tthms, Nov. 27, 1994, at 1. The company claims that the Eclipse eliminates
95% of secondhand smoke with a taste that is comparable to regular cigarettes. Id. If the Eclipse
works as Rj. Reynolds promises and it becomes popular, then the accommodation of both
smokers and nonsmokers at work may become possible.
66 See infra notes 71-138 and accompanying text.
67
 Ezra, supra note 64, at 916-17.
614 See Paolella, supra note 61, at 615.
63 See Gupum v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 205-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.. 59 (1994).
76 See Kraft, supra note 1, at 343-45.
7 ' 418 F. Stipp. 716, 722 (E.D. La. 1976), affil, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
72 Id. at 717. There were seven named plaintiffs who represented all nonsmokers who had
attended or would in the future attend events in the Louisiana Superdome. Id.
73 Id,
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rejected their arguments on several grounds and concluded that the
Constitution does not guarantee a right to breathe smoke-free air. 74
First, the court stated that the fact that the plaintiffs had to breathe
smoke-filled air in order to attend events at the Superdome did not
interfere with the exercise of their First Amendment rights. 75 The court
reasoned that permitting smoking did not restrict the right to enjoy
events any more than charging admission or selling alcoholic bever-
ages does.'" Second, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not
deprived of their due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments because they could simply choose not to attend events
in the Louisiana Superdome and, by extension, not to breathe tobacco
smoke." Finally, the court declared that the plaintiffs' claim to a fun-
damental right to be free from cigarette smoke extended beyond the
boundaries of the Ninth Amendment because it constituted a relatively
minor social problem that did not rise to the level of constitutional
regulation." According to the court, the legislature could probably
address such a social problem more appropriately than the judiciary."
In conclusion, the court held that the United States Constitution does
not protect nonsmokers from breathing cigarette smoke in a public
facility.8°
Similarly, in 1983, in Kensell v. Oklahoma, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the United States Constitu-
tion does not provide a cause of action for a state employee whose
exposure to smoke in his workplace exacerbated his allergic condi-
tion. 8 ' Anthony Kensell suffered from respiratory and cardiovascular
problems due to an allergy to cigarette smoke. 82 Mr. Kensell filed a
lawsuit under the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution against his employer, the State of Okla-
homa, when it refused to restrict smoking in his work space. 83 The
court stated that the plaintiff voluntarily took a position in an office
where he knew or should have known that people would smoke and
that he could choose to quit his job or transfer to another office. 84
Unless a person had no choice but to endure the smoke, the court
74 See id. at 718-22.
75 Id. at 718.
76 Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718.
77 See id. at 720.
76 See id. at 721-22.
79 Id. at 722.
" 1 716 F.2d 1350,1351 (10th Cir. 1983).
82 Id. at 1350-51.
" Id. at 1350.
64 See id. at 1351.
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claimed that it could not impose a smoking ban in the workplace."
Thus, the court held that Kensell had no constitutional cause of action
against his employer for failing to protect him from exposure to smoke
in the workplace."
B. Disability Claims
In 1982, in Vickers v. Veterans Administration, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington held that an
employer is not required to place a ban on smoking for the sake of a
nonsmoker who is sensitive to tobacco smoke absent a statute or regu-
lation that prohibits smoking in the workplace.87 Lanny Vickers, who
had a hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke, worked in a temporary office
building where many other employees smoked." His employer, the
Veterans Administration (the "VA"), instituted a nationwide policy of
attempting to strike a balance between smoking and nonsmoking em-
ployees." The VA took various steps to reduce the amount of smoke
in the plaintiff's office, but it did not enact a smoking ban." Mr. Vickers
continued to complain about the effects of ETS on his health and
eventually sued his employer under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the
"Rehabilitation Act") for injunctive relief and damages. 9 '
The court concluded that an allergy to cigarette smoke constituted
a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act because it
substantially limited one of the plaintiff's major life activities, his ability
to work in a smoke-filled environment. 92 The court held, however, that
the VA had made reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff by
85 See id.
ss Kensell, 716 F.2d at 1351,
87 549 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (W.D. Wash, 1982).
88 Id. at 87.
89 1d. at 88.
80 See id. at 88-89. The VA separated the desks of smokers and nonsmokers, obtained a
voluntary agreement from smokers not to smoke in the plaintiffs presence, installed two vents
in the office and offered to build a partition around plaintiff's desk or move his desk closer to a
window. Id.
91 Id. at 86, 89; see Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her
or his disability, he excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
At the time the Vickers case was decided, the term "handicap" was used in place of the term
"disability," but the statute was identical in all other respects. See Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203,
205 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994).
92 Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 86-87. The relevant part of the statute defines an "individual with
a disability" as "any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
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doing as much as it could short of instituting a total ban on smoking."
The court asserted that until Congress enacted a ban on smoking in
government offices, the rights of smokers must be protected as well. 94
Thus, the court denied the plaintiff relief because the VA had reason-
ably accommodated his handicap."
Later cases, however, disagree with the interpretation of the term
"handicapped person" used in Vickers. 96 For example, in 1994, in Gup-
ta?' v. Virginia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that an allergy to tobacco smoke was not a handicap under
the Rehabilitation Act. 97 When the plaintiff, Betty Gupton, began work
for the Virginia Department of Transportation in March 1990, she
requested and received a cubicle in a nonsmoking area." Although Ms.
Gupton sat approximately sixty feet from the nearest smoking area, she
claimed she was still inhaling smoke." After one month, she took an
unpaid leave and never returned to work.'" The court reasoned that
in order to prove that she had a disability within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff needed to show that her allergy pre-
vented her from holding a position in a general field.'°' Because the
plaintiff only offered evidence that she could not work in that particu-
lar office, the court reasoned that her allergy did not actually limit her
ability to work.' 02 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff had no
cause of action because an allergy to tobacco smoke does not constitute
a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act.'"
C. Common-Law Claims
In 1976, in Shimp v. New jersey Bell Telephone Co., the Superior
Court of New jersey held that because employees have a right to a safe
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1988 & Stipp. V 1993).
93 Vickers, 549 F. Stipp. at 89.
94 See id.
96 Id. at 89-90.
96 See. Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 722 F. Stipp. 633,63.9 (D. Or. 1989) (telephone installer
with sensitivity to heat was not handicapped), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990). The Miller
court held that an impairment qualifies as a handicap only if it limits a person's ability to obtain
a position in general, rather than a specific position. Id.
97 14 F.3d 203,205-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994).
98 Id. at 204.
99 Id.
10° Id.
1 ° 1 Id. at 205.
192 Gupton, 14 F.3d at 205.
193 1d. at 205-06.
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work environment, employers must prohibit smoking in work areas.'"
The plaintiff, Donna Shimp, worked in an office where her employer
allowed employees to smoke at their desks. 1 °5
 She was allergic to ciga-
rette smoke and became so ill from exposure at work that she had to
leave early many times.m1 When Ms. Shimp complained, her employer
installed an exhaust fan in her work area that proved insufficient to
prevent an allergic reaction.w7 Ms. Shimp then sued for injunctive relief.'°8
The court concluded that employees have a right to work in an
environment free of recognized and preventable hazards under New
Jersey common law.'°° The court noted that cigarette smoke could not
be considered a voluntarily assumed occupational hazard because the
smoke was not a necessary by-product of her employer's business."°
The court also stated that secondhand tobacco smoke was toxic, espe-
cially to the plaintiff because of her allergy.'" The court ordered the
defendant to ban smoking in its offices and to allow smoking only in
its lunchroom." 2
 Thus, the court held that nonsmokers have a com-
mon-law right to be free from tobacco smoke in the workplace." 3
Similarly, in 1983, in Smith v. Western Electric Co., the Missouri
Court of Appeals held that an employer violated its common-law duty
to provide a safe workplace by not protecting a nonsmoking employee
from exposure to tobacco smoke.'" Paul Smith, the nonsmoker plain-
1 °4 368 A.2d 408, 410 (N.J. Super. GI, Ch. Div. 1976).
1 °6 Id. at 409-10.
106 Id. at 410. The plaintiff suffered from various symptoms, including throat, nasal and eye
irritation, as well as headaches, nausea and vomiting. Id. These symptoms appeared even if only
one smoker was present and they subsided once the plaintiff moved to a smoke-free environment.
Id.
107 Id. After the fan was installed, other employees complained about cold drafts. Id. As a
compromise, the plaintiff only used the Nn at set intervals, which reduced its effectiveness. Id.
"Id. at 409.
1 °9 Shimp, 368 A.2d at 410.
11 ° Id. at 411 ("Plaintiff works in an office. The tools of her trade arc pens, pencils, paper, a
typewriter and a telephone. There is no necessity to fill the air with tobacco smoke in order to
carry on defendant's business ") 
111 /d. at 413. The court noted that the ban on cigarette advertisements along with the
requirement of warning labels demonstrate that cigarettes are hazardous to health and that their
dangers are generally known to the public. See id. at 413-14.
Inld. at 416. The court noted that its ruling should not be difficult Inc the defendant to
implement since the company already forbade smoking around its telephone equipment. Id. The
court stated that the defendant should show as much consideration for its employees' sensitivities
as it did for its machines. Id.
"7 See id. at 415-16. But see Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, Inc., 462 A.2d 10, 15 (D.C.
1983) (court refused to find common-law duty to provide smoke-free workplace for sake of one
sensitive employee without any scientific evidence of effects of secondhand smoke on nonsmokers
in general).
114 643 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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tiff, worked in an office with other employees who smoked while they
worked. 15 Mr. Smith moved to this office in 1967, and, in 1975, he
visited a doctor because he was experiencing respiratory problems." 8
When the plaintiff reported his condition to his employer, his em-
ployer tried moving him to different areas, but each new office con-
tained enough tobacco smoke to trigger the plaintiff's symptoms."' Mr.
Smith then filed a suit for injunctive relief." 8
The court first reaffirmed the common-law rule that an employer
has a duty to use due care to eliminate conditions that are harmful to
its employees.''9 According to the court, the defendant violated this
duty because it knew that tobacco smoke was hazardous to its em-
ployee's health, and because it had the means to prohibit smoking in
certain areas. 12° Thus, the court held the defendant liable for violating
its duty to provide a safe work environment for the plaintiff by not
protecting a nonsmoking employee from secondhand smoke. 12 '
Additionally, in 1988, in McCarthy v. Department of Social and
Health Services, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the State
owed a common-law duty to its employees to provide a workplace free
from tobacco smoke.' 22 Helen McCarthy worked at the Department of
Social and Health Services for ten years in an office where smoking was
commonplace.' 23 She complained to her supervisors that the smoke af-
fected her health, but her employer did not respond.' 24
 Ms. McCarthy
became so ill that she had to leave her position.' 25 The Department of
Labor and Industries denied Ms. McCarthy's claim for workers' compen-
sation benefits because her condition was not an occupational disease.' 28
115 Id. at 12.
"6 1d. The plaintiff complained of a sore throat, nausea, dizziness, headaches, blackouts and
memory loss. Id. With each year of work, these symptoms became more severe. Id. His doctors
told him that he should try to avoid exposure to tobacco smoke. Id.
"7 1d. The defendant also announced that it had adopted a policy of separating smokers and
nonsmokers, but the policy was never implemented. Id. When the plaintiff renewed his com-
plaints, the defendant offered him a choice of wearing a respirator or working in its smoke-free
computer room in a position that paid $500 less per month than his current position. Id. Mr.
Smith tried using the respirator, but it did not relieve his symptoms. Id.
"8 1d. at 11. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's case on the grounds that he failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the plaintiff appealed. Id.
119 Smith, 643 S.W.2d at 12.
120 Id. at 13.
121 Id.
122 759 P.2d 351, 354 (Wash. 1988).
123 Id. at 352.
124 Id. Ms. McCarthy eventually developed a pulmonary disease and her doctor advised her
not to return to work unless she could breathe clean air. Id.
125 1d.
126 Id.
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Ms. McCarthy did not appeal this ruling, but instead sued her em-
ployer for violating its common-law duty to provide a safe work envi-
ronment.'"
According to the court, workers' compensation does not preclude
an employee from suing under another cause of action if a disease is
not covered by the statute. 125 The court recognized that an employer
has a duty to provide a safe workplace for its employees. 129 The court
cited recent reports published by the Surgeon General to establish that
tobacco smoke was harmful to nonsmokers.'" The court stated that it
would impose a duty on the employer to alleviate the problems caused
by tobacco smoke whenever a plaintiff could prove an employer's
awareness of its detrimental effects."' Thus, the court held that an
employer who knows that ETS is harmful to nonsmokers has a com-
mon-law duty to take "reasonable precautions" to protect its employees.' 52
In summary, courts have not allowed nonsmokers to claim a con-
stitutional right to breathe smoke-free air. 185 In addition, post
- Vickers
decisions have ruled that an allergy to ETS is not a disability.'s 4 Thus,
nonsmokers may have a lesser chance of success with a claim against
their employers under the Rehabilitation Act." 5 Courts have held,
however, that employers who allow smoking in areas where nonsmok-
ers work may violate their common-law duty to provide a safe work
127 McCarthy, 759 P.2d at 352-53.
' 28 1d. at 354. The State had argued that Ms. McCarthy's action was precluded because the
Washington Industrial Insurance Act contained an exclusive remedy provision. Id.
129 Id. at 354.
II° Id. at 355. The court referred to the Surgeon General's 1986 report on smoking. Id.; see
also SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6.
131 McCarthy, 759 I',2d at 356. The court cautioned, however, that its holding was limited to
the effects on the health of a typical employee rather than a hypersensitive employee. Id.
' 52 Id. The court noted that the reasonable precautions requirement did not mean that an
employer had to provide every nonsmoker with a completely smoke-free environment regardless
of cost. Id. The court did not make any suggestions as to how the employer should have
accommodated the plaintiff in this case. See id.
One justice dissented in part, saying that the majority had no legal precedent for requiring
an employer to ban tobacco smoke. Id. at 358 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Justice Brachtenbach suggested that this type of regulation should be left to the
legislature. /d. (Brachtenbach, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133 See Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350,1351 (10th Cir. 1983); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium
& Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716,722 (E.D. La. 1976), affil, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
"4 Compare Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203,205-06 (4th Cir. 1994) (tobacco allergy was not
a disability) with Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85,86-87 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (tobacco
allergy was disability).
1 " See Gupton, 14 F.3d at 205-06. Applying the reasoning of this case, plaintiffs would
probably also be denied disabled status under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which
uses a similar definition of disability and applies to all employers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12112
(Supp. V 1993).
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environment."" The plaintiff in McCarthy originally attempted to ob-
tain workers' compensation benefits for her injury, but never appealed
the denial of benefits in court.'" The next section examines whether
workers' compensation acts may cover secondhand smoke-related in-
juries.' 38
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
A. Background
Workers' compensation provides benefits to persons who suffer
injuries in the course of their employment."9
 An employee receives a
set amount of benefits and waives the common-law right to sue the
employer for damages."° Near the end of the nineteenth century, the
growing industrialization of the United States spurred the movement
toward providing workers' compensation for job-related injuries."' By
1920, the vast majority of states had enacted some type of compensa-
tion act."2 The typical act usually pays benefits to employees for acci-
dents arising out of their employment or for occupational diseases.'"
Most workers' compensation acts provide remuneration for personal
injuries that occur "by accident." 144 In general, an accident only includes
unexpected injuries.'" Commentators note, however, that whether the
cause or result should be unexpected remains unclear."" Furthermore,
the injury must be attributable to a specific time, place and cause. 147
Once again, however, the timing requirement may apply to either
cause or result. 14" Thus, the clearest case of an accidental injury occurs
when both cause and result are unexpected and definite in time."'
136 See McCarthy, 759 P.2d at 356; Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W,2d 10, 13 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Shimp v. New jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 531 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
13.7 See McCarthy, 759 P.2d at 352-53.
138 See infra notes 139-220 and accompanying text.
139
 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.00 (1994).
rto I id.
 § 1.10.
141 Seel id. § 5.20. The number of industrial accidents had increased but there were few legal
remedies. 1 id. Various states appointed commissions to study the problem. 1 id. In 1910,
commission members attended a conference in Chicago where they drafted a Uniform Work-
men's Compensation Law, which established a framework for state legislation. I id.
142 1 id. § 5.30. By 1963, all 50 states had workers' compensation statutes in place. 1 id.
1481 id. § 1.10.
144
 See 1 A LARSON, 51.1Pra note 139, § 37.00. Nine states do not require that the injury be
accidental. IA id. § 37.10.
' 45 IA id. § 37.20.
146 See IA id.
147 1A id.
148 1A id.
149 IA LARSON, 51./Pra note 139, § 37.20.
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Other combinations make up a continuum along which the results of
litigation mark the boundaries of accidental injuries.'"
For example, in 1975, in Middleton v. Coxsackie Correctional Facility,
the Court of Appeals of New York held that a corrections officer
sustained an accidental injury after contracting tuberculosis through
exposure to a sick prisoner.''' In 1969, Kenneth Middleton worked in
the cannery of a correctional facility in close contact with an inmate
who was diagnosed with tuberculosis.'" After approximately one year,
Mr. Middleton developed a severe cough that turned out to be a
symptom of tuberculosis.'" Although the Workers' Compensation Board
declared the injury accidental, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court reversed the award of benefits.'" The plaintiff appealed this
decision.'"
The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that Mr. Middleton's
illness constituted an accidental injury.' 56 The court reasoned that a
"common-sense viewpoint" should determine whether an illness qualifies
as an accidental injury.'" In addition, the court noted that an accident
did not need to be the result of a sudden catastrophe, but that it could
result from gradual exposure. 158 Using this construction of the term
"accidental injury," the court held that exposure to a tubercular inmate
over a period of three or four months leading to an illness does
constitute an accidental injury covered by Workers' Compensation Law.' 5"
All of the current workers' compensation acts also furnish benefits
for occupational diseases.' 6" In the past, some state acts only provided
benefits for accidental injuries.''' Consequently, the acts often defined
an occupational disease as anything that did not qualify as an accident
but could be attributed to employment conditions. 162 Today, most ju-
risdictions define an "occupational disease" as a disease that results
from hazards present in a particular type of employment, as opposed
1 " See IA id.
151 341 N.E.2d 527, 531-32 (N.Y. 1975).
1 i2 1d. at 528.
155 1d.
154 See id. Although this case and other early cases use the term "workmen's compensation,"
I am using the current term "workers' compensation" throughout this Note for consistency.
155 See id.
155 Middleton, 341 N.E,2d at 531-32.
157
 Id. at 530.
1511 Id, at 530. The court noted that an injury could be accidental if one could point to a
definite time for either the cause or result of the injury. Id.
15g
 Id. at 531-32.
15° 1B LARSON, supra note 139, § 41.00.
161 See IB id. § 41.31.
162 See 1B id. § 41.00.
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to a disease that may result from any occupation or from life outside
of work.'"
Using a common judicial definition of an occupational disease,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in Roofner v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, held that an employee's lung disease was
not an occupational disease because of an absence of evidence of a
greater prevalence of that disease in his line of work than in other
occupations.'F"' During his term of employment as a laborer, the plain-
tiff's duties included hammering dents out of rusted, dusty barrels
from a warehouse and transporting them.' 65
 The plaintiff later con-
tracted emphysema.' 66
 A physician who examined the plaintiff stated
that the dusty warehouse environment probably caused his illness.' 67
The court noted that to prove an occupational disease, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) exposure to the condition arose from
employment; (2) the condition was causally related to the industry;
and (3) the condition is more prevalent in that industry than in the
general population.' The court reasoned that although the plaintiff
established that working in a dusty warehouse likely caused his emphy-
sema, the plaintiff did not offer any evidence regarding the relative
incidence of the disease in the general population.'" Thus, the court
held that employees cannot receive workers' compensation for an
occupational disease unless they can prove that their illness occurs
more often in their occupation than in others.'"
B. Secondhand Smoke Claims
One commentator suggested in 1987 that an injury caused by
secondhand smoke did not qualify as either an accidental injury or an
occupational disease as defined by workers' compensation acts."' Con-
sequently, he predicted that employees who attempted to request work-
163 lb	 § 41.32.
164
 392 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
165 Id. at 347.
166 Id.
167 1d.
168 Id. at 398.
169 Roofner, 392 A.2d at 348.
170 See id.
171 Paolella, supra note 61, at 609-12. Paolella suggests that smoke-related injuries are not
accidental because they occur after long-term exposure with no definite time of injury and
because simply inhaling air is not an injury. Id. at 611. He also proposes that these injuries are
not occupational diseases because almost every work environment contains some tobacco smoke.
Id. As a result, an employee is not more likely to sustain a smoke-related injury in one occupation
than another. Id.
September 1995]	 SMOKERS v. NONSMOKERS	 1105
ers' compensation for smoke-related injuries would not be successful.'"
Initially, court decisions were consistent with this assessment.'"
In 1988, in Mack v. County of Rockland, the Court of Appeals of
New York held that an illness caused by exposure to cigarette smoke
at work did not constitute an occupational disease. 174 The plaintiff, a
psychiatric social worker, had an eye disorder.' 7' This disorder wors-
ened after the plaintiff's exposure to cigarette smoke in her office.'"
Although an administrative law judge awarded workers' compensation
to the plaintiff, the Workers' Compensation Board reversed the deci-
sion.'" The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affir-
med and the plaintiff filed an appeal.'"
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the term "occupa-
tional disease" refers to conditions that result from recognized risks
inherent in a particular type of employment,'" The court reasoned
that because exposure to cigarette smoke was not a natural part of a
social worker's position, the plaintiff's injury was not an occupational
disease.' 8° Thus, the court held that the plaintiff had not suffered a
compensable occupational disease due to her exposure to tobacco
smoke. ' " '
Similarly, in 1992, in Palmer v. Del Webb's High Sierra, the Supreme
Court of Nevada held that an employee who developed a lung disease
as a result of his exposure to ETS at work could not receive benefits
under the state's Workers' Compensation Law.' 82 The plaintiff, James
Palmer, worked surrounded by smoking customers during his twenty
years as a "pit boss" in a casino.'" After he experienced problems
breathing, Mr. Palmer visited several doctors who diagnosed respira-
tory problems and advised him not to return to work unless he could
avoid tobacco smoke.' 84 Mr. Palmer then filed a claim for workers'
172 Id, at 612.
173 See, e.g., Palmer v, Del Webb's High Sierra, 838 P.2d 435, 435 (Nev. 1992); Mack v. County
of Rockland, 525 N.E.2d 744, 744 (N.Y. 1988).





179 Mack, 525 N.E.2d at 744. New York law defines an occupational disease as 	 disease
resulting from the nature of employment and contracted therein." N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW § 2(15) (McKinney 1992).
18° Mack, 525 N.E.2d at 744.
181 See id.
182 838 P.2d 435, 437 (Nev. 1992).
183 Id. at 437-38 (Young, J., concurring).
184 Id. at 438 (Young, J., concurring).
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compensation.'" The Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether
an illness caused by exposure to secondhand smoke is compensable as
an occupational disease pursuant to workers' compensation.'"
The court held that although ETS is common to the environment
of a casino, it does not constitute a hazard incidental to the nature of
employment in a casino.'" Furthermore, the court noted that workers
may be exposed to ETS outside of work.'" The court reasoned that Mr.
Palmer did not show a sufficient relationship between his employment
and his illness to fall within the purview of an occupational disease.' 89
Thus, the court held that illnesses caused by exposure to secondhand
smoke in the workplace are not occupational diseases and, as such, are
not covered by workers' compensation. 19°
The courts in both Mack and Palmer decided that secondhand
smoke-related injuries were not occupational diseases. 191 Neither case,
however, ever discussed whether injuries caused by secondhand smoke
might qualify as accidental injuries pursuant to workers' compensa-
tion. A recent New York case addressed this issue directly.' 92
C. The Johannesen Case
In 1994, in fohannesen v. New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development, the Court of Appeals of New York held
that bronchial asthma caused by prolonged exposure to secondhand
tobacco smoke qualified as an accidental injury under workers' com-
pensation law.'" The plaintiff, Veronica Johannesen, was an office
assistant whose illness became aggravated as a result of breathing
co-workers' tobacco smoke while at work.'" Ms. Johannesen sought
workers' compensation benefits for her illness. 195 The Court of Appeals
185 Id. Mr. Palmer's claim was first denied by his employer and later rejected at an adminis-
trative hearing. Id. at 438. At an administrative appeal, the appeals officer overturned the earlier
ruling, finding that Mr. Palmer's injury was compensable. Id. High Sierra then appealed to the
district court. See id.
186 Id. at 435.
187 Palmer, 838 P.2d at 435. The Nevada Occupational Disease Act states, The disease must
be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of the employer
and employee." NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.440(2) (1995).
188 Palmer, 838 P.2d at 435.
H9 See id, at 435-36,
1 `x' See id. at 437.
151 Id. at 435; Mack, 525 N.E.2d at 744.
192 638 N.E.2d 981, 982 (N.Y. 1994).
155
 Id. at 985-86.
194 Id. at 982.
115 Id.
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reasoned that her illness constituted an accidental injury because ex-
posure to ETS was not a natural side effect of employment in an
office.' 96
 Thus, the court concluded that Ms. Johannesen was entitled
to workers' compensation benefits as a result of her exposure to sec-
ondhand smoke in the workplace. 1 °7
Ms. Johannesen worked in a large room where approximately half
of the employees smoked at their desks)" After two years in this work
environment, Ms. Johannesen developed a cough and a wheeze. 19° Two
years later, her doctor diagnosed her condition as bronchial asthma
and recommended a smoke-free environment.!" Although Ms. Johan-
nesen requested a transfer, her employer denied her request.'"' Ms.
Johannesen then sought workers' compensation benefits for her con-
dition. 202
 While her hearing was pending, Ms. Johannesen experienced
two serious asthma attacks, both requiring hospitalization. 203
At an administrative hearing, the workers' compensation law judge
awarded Ms. Johannesen compensation on the theory that she had
acquired an occupational disease.204 The Workers' Compensation Board
(the "Board") affirmed, but disagreed with the judge's reasoning. 205
The Board reasoned that Ms. Johannesen was entitled to compensation
because she suffered from an accidental injury as a result of her
exposure to secondhand smoke. 206
 The Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
vision, affirmed this result, holding that the tobacco smoke in Ms.
Johannesen's office was an unusual environmental hazard that led to
an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation
Law. 207 Ms. Johannesen's employer appealed this decision. 208
The New York Court of Appeals held that Ms. Johannesen's illness
constituted an accidental injury. 2" The court first stated that the state
enacted the Workers' Compensation Law as a remedy for workers
11"i Id. at 985.
197 Johannesen, 638 N.E.2d at 985-86.
1118 Id. at 982. Approximately 50 employees worked in this office in which the windows were








20" Id. at 983.
2°7Jobannesen v. New York City Dep't of Hons. Preservation and Dev., 546 N.Y.S.2d 40,41
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
208 see id.
2"Johannesen, 638 N.E.2d at 985-86.
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injured in the course of their employment. 216 The court relied on the
"common-sense" approach taken by the Middleton court in defining
the term "accidental injury."'" According to the court, an accidental
injury not only refers to sudden occurrences, but also encompasses
conditions that form gradually. 212
 The court noted both that the office
in which Ms. Johannesen worked contained an excessive amount of
tobacco smoke due to the number of smokers and lack of ventilation,
and that this environment could have caused a degeneration in the
plaintiff's condition over time. 2 ' 3
The court also determined that the plaintiff should not have
anticipated the risk of the smoke because it was not a natural conse-
quence of her employment.'" The court reasoned that, although many
people smoke cigarettes, exposure to ETS is not a natural side effect
of working in an office. 216
 Moreover, the court determined that the
timing of the plaintiff's illness showed a sufficient connection to her
exposure to tobacco smoke at work because, among other things, she
collapsed twice while on the job. 216 The court found that, in a workers'
compensation claim, any predisposition to an asthmatic condition is
immaterial.217
Finally, the court rejected the employer's argument that this deci-
sion would "open the floodgates" by making any type of allergy or
common cold compensable. 218
 The court concluded that its ruling did
not change the standards for proving an accidental injury because
plaintiffs still had to demonstrate that unusual working conditions or
events caused their injuries. 219 Consequently, the court held that Ms.
Johannesen's condition resulted from her exposure to secondhand
21 ') See id. at 983. The New York Workers' Compensation Law provides in pertinent part:
"Every employer . . . shall . . . secure compensation to his employees and pay or provide com-
pensation for their disability or death from injury arising out of and in the course of the
employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury ...." N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW § 10(1) (McKinney 1992).
211 See johannesen, 638 N.E.2d at 983.
212 Id. at 984. The Workers' Compensation Law states that, "'Injury' and 'persona] injury'
mean only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease
or infection as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom." N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW § 2(7) (McKinney 1992). The court noted that the term "accidental injury" has no statutory
definition, but that its application developed through case law. See Johannesen, 638 N.E.2d at 984.
215Johannesen, 638 N.E.2d at 984-85.
214




218Johannesen, 638 N.E.2d at 985.
219 Id.
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smoke in her office and that this condition constituted an accidental
injury for which she could pursue a remedy under Workers' Compen-
sation Law.22°
IV. SMOKERS' RIGHTS
Despite the strength of recent claims by nonsmokers, employers
who wish to institute widespread smoking bans may still face opposi-
tion.2" As of 1992, twenty-one states had enacted legislation that pre-
vented employers from refusing to hire smokers. 222 Furthermore, many
smokers unhappy with smoking restrictions have taken their grievances
to court. 2" Although only a few smokers have brought successful law-
suits against their employers, the courts have recognized that there are
limits to how far employers can go in regulating smoking. 224
In 1980, in fohns-Manville Sales Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machin-
ists, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
an employer could not prohibit smoking on all of its property because
this policy violated a collective bargaining agreement. 225 The employer,
Johns-Manville, manufactured asbestos products. 22° Because of the dan-
gers associated with the combination of smoking and asbestos, Johns-
Manville adopted a rule that prohibited smoking on all company prop-
erty.227 Any violations of this rule led to disciplinary sanctions and after
five violations, discharge. 228 When the union complained that this pol-
icy violated a collective bargaining agreement, the two parties went to
arbitration. 22° The arbitrator declared the ban invalid and suggested
that the company designate smoking areas for employees to use during
breaks."° The employer filed a lawsuit to set aside the arbitrator's
decision on the grounds that it violated public policy."
220 Id. at 985-86.
222 See infra notes 225-46 and accompanying text; see also Kramer & Calder, supra note 15,
at 313.
222 Kramer & Calder, supra note 15, at 323.
223 See Jim Schachter, Where There's Smoke, There's Ire, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,1988, at 4:1.
224 See infra notes 225-46 and accompanying text.
228 See 621 F.2d 756,757,759-60 (5th Cir. 1980).
226 /d. at 757.
227 Id. The company spent millions of dollars to improve the air quality of its plant. Id. Despite
the reduction in levels of contaminants, an expert testified that smokers who work with even low
levels of contaminants run 92 times the risk of dying from lung cancer than nonsmokers. Id.
228 Id. The company set up a program of encouragement and psychological support in order
to help smokers quit. Id.
2291d.
2''0Johns-Manville, 621 E2d at 757.
291 See id. at 758-59.
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According to the court, an arbitration award that violates a law
will not be enforced.232 The court noted, however, that no statutes
or regulations required an employer to restrict smoking. 233 Although
Johns-Manville argued that public policy generally supports an em-
ployer's efforts to eradicate health hazards, the court reasoned that
this policy justification was insufficient to overturn an arbitration award
that accorded with a collective bargaining agreement. 234 Thus, the
court held that an employer may not institute a smoking restriction if
it violates the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, despite
public policy justifications. 235
In 1987, in Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a fire department's ban
on smoking for trainees as constitutional because of the state interest
involved. 236 The Oklahoma City Fire Department required all first year
firefighter trainees to sign an agreement stating that they would not
smoke during the training period whether or not they were on duty."'
Greg Grusendorf, a trainee, took three puffs of a cigarette on his lunch
break. 238 When another employee reported the incident, the employer
promptly discharged him.2" Mr. Grusendorf sued the city claiming that
the policy violated his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 246 The court stated that the
policy infringed upon trainees' privacy because it affected conduct
outside of the workplace."' The court, however, presumed the policy
valid because of the state's strong interest in regulating its employees. 242
The court then reasoned that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
the policy irrational and arbitrary. 243 The court noted that the health risks
232 Id. at 758.
233 Id. at 758-59.
234 See id. at 759. The court stated that smoking in an asbestos plant harms the smoker, but
does not harm third persons. See id. The court noted that if the company wished to protect
nonsmokers, then the arbitrator's suggestion that they designate special smoking areas would
solve that problem. See id.
235 johns -Manville, 621 F.2d at 759-60; see also Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 459 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1983) (court held that employer's ban on smoking
at work stations could not be enacted without submitting it to a mandatory bargaining process).
236 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987).
237 Id. at 540, 543.
23'3 Id. at 540.
239 Id.
249 Id. at 541.
241 Grusendorf. 816 F.2d at 541. The opinion stated, It can hardly be disputed that the
Oklahoma City Fire Department's non-smoking regulation infringes upon the liberty and privacy
of the firefighter trainees. The regulation reaches well beyond the work place and well beyond
the hours for which they receive pay." Id.
242 Id. at 543.
243 Id.
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associated with cigarette smoking are well-known and that firefighters
need to be in top physical condition.'" The court also considered the
possibility that smoking habits may exacerbate the effects of smoke
inhalation when fighting fires. 245
 Thus, the court allowed enforcement
of the regulation because it had a rational connection to job perform-
ance. 246
V. THE EMPLOYER'S DI LEMMA
Employers are caught in the middle of workplace disputes be-
tween smokers and nonsmokers. Their primary concern should be
avoiding liability from lawsuits on either side. They may also wish to
reduce the costs associated with workplace smoking, such as higher
maintenance and insurance costs.'" Commentators suggest that the
legislature should regulate smoking in the workplace.L 4" Until that
happens, however, employers must bear the pressure of following the
guidelines set forth by various courts, as well as predict where future
decisions will go.
A. The Significance ofjohannesen
One major question raised by fohannesen is whether other juris-
dictions will follow its reasoning and include exposure to ETS as an
accidental injury. Other courts may disagree with the decision because
secondhand smoke-related injuries do not resemble typical workers'
compensation accidents.'" Conditions caused by exposure to ETS lack
the element of suddenness that most courts seek when classifying an
injury as an accident.'" Some courts, however, have found accidental
injuries where exposure and illness are gradual by conceptualizing
each impact or inhalation as a separate accident."•" Moreover, courts
are more likely to designate an injury as an accident if at least one
241 id. The court alluded to the Surgeon General's warning on cigarettes as proof of the
health risks of smoking. Id.
245 hi.
246 Grusendrof 816 F,2d at 543.
247 Ezra, supra note 64, at 909. Furthermore, employees who smoke and nonsmoking em-
ployees exposed to ETS may require more sick leave. Id. at 910. The estimated annual cost of
lost productivity and health care due to workplace smoking is between $27 and $61 billion. Id.
248 See kornblum, supra note 53, at 201-02; Paolella, supra note 61, at 632.
249 See Paolella, supra note 61, at 611.
250
 See 1A LARSON, supra note 139, § 37.20.
2511B, id.
compensation for conditions that have developed, not instantaneously, but gradually over periods
ranging from a few hours to several decades, culminating in disability from silicosis, asbestosis,
and other dust diseases, pneumonia, lead poisoning, ... and the like.").
39.00; see 113 id. § 39.10 ("(Mlost jurisdictions have at some time awarded
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aspect of the injury (i.e., the cause or the result) is sudden or definite
in time. 252
 The plaintiff in Johannesen contracted bronchial asthma,
which worsened to a point where she suffered two sudden collapses at
work. 253
 Those collapses provided the court with a definite time for the
result of the plaintiffs injury. Difficulties may arise, however, for plain-
tiffs whose injuries do not develop as quickly or do not lead to a sudden
collapse. Thus, courts may decline to rule that smoke-related injuries
are accidental because these injuries do not fit the prototypical model
of an accident.254
 New York decisions, however, appear influential and,
thus, at least a few jurisdictions may follow Johannesen.
If other courts agree that workers' compensation covers injuries
caused by exposure to ETS at work, then nonsmokers will encounter
both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, nonsmokers
could apply to an administrative agency for benefits and avoid filing a
lawsuit.255
 In addition, the rate of compensation is a guaranteed amount
based on the worker's earnings at the time of the injury. 256
On the other hand, workers' compensation awards are "modest"
and may not compare with the amount that a plaintiff could get from
a sympathetic jury.257
 Even worse, however, nonsmokers would lose the
option of suing under any other cause of action, such as the employer's
common-law duty.25g Workers' compensation acts provide immunity for
employers for any injuries covered by the compensation statutes. 259
Thus, if courts decide that workers' compensation covers smoke-re-
lated injuries, the statutes will bar all other causes of action.
Courts will probably split over whether to apply the reasoning in
Johannesen to their own workers' compensation statutes. Courts that do
classify conditions caused by exposure to ETS as accidents will provide
workers' compensation awards, but will bar nonsmoking plaintiffs from
proceeding with a common-law claim. In jurisdictions that do not
follow Johannesen, nonsmokers will still have a common-law claim and
252
 See 113 id.
255 See Johannesen, 638 N.E.2d 981, 982 (NY. 1994).
254 See IA LARSON, supra note 139, § 37.20. Courts have split over whether "accidental injury"
includes cases similar to ETS exposure, such as those involving exposure to cold, heat, dampness,
dust or fumes that lead to a disease. IA id. § 38.50. Furthermore, differences in the exact wording
of the state statutes may affect court decisions. See IA id.
255 See 1 LARSON, supra note 139, § 1.10; JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION 70 (1989).
256 See 1 LARSON, supra note 189, § 1.10; NACKLEY, supra note 255, at 44-45.
257
 See 1 LARSON, supra note 139, § 1.10.
255 See 1 id.; NACKLEY, supra note 255, at 91.
259 NACKLEY, supra note 255, at 91. Employers are not immune to suit for injuries caused by
intentional acts, but ETS claims are generally based on an employer's negligence. See id.
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will have a good chance of succeeding on such a claim. In the end,
employers will probably face liability in every jurisdiction for either a
workers' compensation claim or a common-law claim. Thus, the careful
employer should analyze cases in its jurisdiction and, assuming that at
least one type of claim will succeed, take steps to guard against liability.
B. Enacting Smoking Restrictions at Work
In general, an employer should not restrict smoking any further
than is necessary. 2" Even so, the employer may face challenges to its
smoking restrictions from smokers.'i't Yet, the employer who retains the
status quo will be vulnerable to attacks by nonsmokers. As the literature
on the health hazards of passive smoking increases, courts will probably
assume that employers are aware of these risks and hold them liable
for any consequences. 262 Since no regulatory guidelines exist for em-
ployers to follow, they must look to the specific fact situations of prior
court decisions to formulate smoking policies that will protect them
from legal attack.
As the decision in Johns
-Manville illustrates, union employers must
abide by collective bargaining agreements when instituting a new smok-
ing policy. 26' Non-union employers must consider the relationship of
the policy to their goals. In Grusendorf, the Fifth Circuit upheld a
restriction on smoking by employees both on and off duty only because
it involved the state's interest in the physical health of its firefighters. 264
The court stated in this opinion that the regulation infringed upon
firefighters' right to privacy. 2" Thus, to the extent that the Fifth Circuit
persuades other courts, a private employer could probably not enact
such a restrictive policy unless the employer could articulate a connec-
tion between the policy and job performance to establish that the
policy was not arbitrary. 2" Similarly, courts would probably find that a
policy of not hiring employees who smoke is overly restrictive, and
possibly discriminatory. 267
26(lEzra, supra note 64, at 953. Ezra suggests, 'The best policies will be written, factually




 EPA REPORT, supra note 7; SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6.
2a3 SeeJohns-Manville Sales Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 621 F.2d 756, 759 (5th
Cir. 1980).
264 See Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2(1 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987).
2'15 Id. at 541,
266 See Ezra, supra note 64, at 954; Kramer & Calder, supra note 15, at 324-25.
267 See Kramer & Calder, supra note 15, at 325; L. Lynne Pulliam, Smoking in the Workplace,
EMPLOYEE REL. 14., Dec. 22, 1993, 79, 79.
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As demonstrated by Gasper, nonsmokers do not have a constitu-
tional right to breathe air that is free of ETS. 26s Furthermore, although
an employer has a common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, that
duty does not demand a totally smoke-free workplace. 269 Thus, the most
restrictive policies, such as forbidding employees from smoking either
on the job or at home or not hiring smokers, not only violate smokers'
rights, but also are not necessary to protect nonsmokers' rights.
Consequently, employers should adopt a policy that restricts smok-
ing without banning it completely. Policies in this middle ground
include allowing smoking only on breaks, segregating smokers and
nonsmokers, restricting smoking to specific areas or making special
accommodations for nonsmoking employees who complain about ex-
posure to ETS.27° When enacting these restrictions, employers should
keep the available scientific evidence in mind. For example, merely
separating the desks of smokers and nonsmokers will not protect non-
smokers from the spread of ETS because of the way that ETS disperses
in the air. 27 ' Any segregation policy that does not give smokers and
nonsmokers separate airspace with proper ventilation will not protect
an employer from liability to nonsmokers. Moreover, a segregation
policy may also subject an employer to discrimination claims by which-
ever group is given the more unfavorable workspace. 272
Instead of segregating work areas, employers may want to desig-
nate a particular area where smokers may go on breaks. As long as this
area has sufficient ventilation, nonsmokers will not come into contact
with ETS. One drawback, however, is that smokers may take longer or
more frequent breaks, reducing their productivity. 276 Employers should
minimize this waste of time by making the smoking area as convenient
to work areas as possible.274 Employers may implement many variations
268 Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Sum), 716, 722 (E.D. La. 1976).
269 McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 759 P.2d 351, 356 (Wash. 1988). The
McCarthy court stated:
While an employer has a duty to provide a workplace reasonably free of tobacco
smoke, it is not required to provide a smoke-free environment for each employee
no matter what the cost. However, if an employer is aware of an individual em-
ployee's special or particular sensitivity to tobacco smoke, it has a duty to take
reasonable steps to accommodate the employee's sensitivities.
Id.
27° See Pulliam, supra note 267, at 79.
271 See SURGEON GENERAL (1986), supra note 6, at 11-12.
272 See Ezra, supra note 64, at 930-31. Segregation may also lower employee morale and
escalate conflicts between smokers and nonsmokers by creating an "'us versus them' mentality."
Id. at 930.
273 See DOUVILLE, supra note 39, at 110.
279 See id. For example, if an employer only allows employees to smoke outside of the
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of this type of restriction depending upon their needs. The feasibility
of different policies will depend on various factors, such as company
size, number of smokers and expense of implementation.
The best policy will restrict smoking only as much as is necessary
to allow nonsmokers to do their jobs without coming into contact with
ETS. 275
 The employer should put the policy and its objectives in writ-
ing. 276
 Such a writing will help to show that the policy is rationally
related to legitimate concerns in any subsequent litigation. In the end,
employers should implement some type of restriction on smoking
rather than allowing employees to smoke in all areas because nonsmok-
ers have legitimate legal claims for injuries. When implementing a
policy, however, employers should not overcompensate by totally elimi-
nating smoking from the company because courts have supported
smokers' rights as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts recently have become more sympathetic to nonsmokers
who complain of exposure to ETS in the workplace. One reason for
this trend is that scientific evidence reported by authorities such as the
Surgeon General of the United States and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency documents the serious health effects of ETS. Although
courts have not favored nonsmokers who bring constitutional and
disability claims, courts have upheld claims made under the common-
law duty to provide a safe workplace and more recently, workers'
compensation statutes. The bottom line for employers is that nonsmok-
ers are armed with legitimate causes of action and unless employers
take steps to restrict smoking in work areas, courts will hold them liable
for any harmful effects on their employees. At the same time, smokers
may sue employers whose restrictions go so far that they infringe upon
privacy or discriminate against smokers as a group. As a result, employ-
ers need to draft their smoking policies carefully so that they strike a
reasonable balance between these two groups.
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building, they will waste more time reaching the smoking area (and feel more disgruntled,
especially when the weather is inclement). On the other hand, if an employer provides a
ventilated smoking room on every floor, travel time will be reduced.
275 See Ezra, supra note 64, at 953.
2743 See id.
